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THE PRIVILEGE STOPS AT THE BORDER, 
EVEN IF A COMMUNICATION KEEPS GOING 
 
Consequences of the Disparity Between U.S. and E.U. Treatment of 






Suppose that a South Carolina attorney provides solicited legal 
advice to a corporate client that operates in both South Carolina and the 
European Union.  The practitioner may assume that the attorney-client 
privilege protects that communication.  Is the attorney correct? 
The answer may well be no, depending on where the question is 
asked.  If the client employs the attorney as in-house counsel, then a 
court of the European Union would likely not honor the privilege.  
Indeed, in Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd. v. European Commission, the 
European Court of Justice mandates this result.
1
  Conversely, a South 
Carolina court would likely uphold the privilege based on the 
evidentiary rules of the forum and the strong public policy in favor of 
the attorney-client privilege.
2
  However, if the right conditions were in 
place, a court of this state could reasonably find that the attorney-client 
privilege did not attach.  
This note seeks to educate South Carolina practitioners on the 
state of E.U.-level evidentiary privilege law and the possible 
implications for their practices involving clients operating under E.U. 
jurisdiction.  Part I will discuss the development of E.U. privilege law 
through the European Court of Justice decision in Akzo and explore the 
weight and scope of that opinion.  Part II will analyze the practical 
implications of this body of law for South Carolina attorneys in the 
context of cross-border communications from in-house attorneys and 
                                                 
*  David S. Jones is a J.D. candidate at the University of South Carolina 
School of Law, class of 2013. He holds a bachelor of liberal arts in 
international studies from the University of South Carolina, class of 2006. 
1  Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 EUR-Lex 
CELEX 62007J0550 (E.C.J. Sept. 14, 2010), available at http://eurlex.europa. 
eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62007J0550:EN:HTML (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2012). 
2  See State v. Love, 275 S.C. 55, 59, 271 S.E.2d 110, 112 (1980).  
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predict how a South Carolina court might address a challenge to an 
assertion of privilege over such a communication.  
 
I. CURRENT EUROPEAN-UNION PRIVILEGE LAW: NOT THE 
TYPICAL AMERICAN ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE  
A. BACKGROUND: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF E.U. STRUCTURAL FACTORS 
The European Union (E.U.) is a supra-national organization of 
independent European countries.
3
  The E.U. is a continually evolving 
project, and is neither a loose treaty organization nor a centralized 
federation.
4
  The E.U. government is composed of several institutions, 
including three major branches: the European Parliament, the European 
Commission, and the European Court of Justice.
5
  While these three 
branches of government are separate, they are not equal in the 
American sense.  The European Commission is the dominant force in 




The International HR Journal has done an excellent job of 
describing the judicial relationship between the European Commission 
and the European Court of Justice:  
The [European] Commission has investigative and 
enforcement powers over entities operating within 
the E.U.  Once the Commission finds a violation, the 
entity's recourse is to have the Court of Justice review 
the Commission's decision. 
The Court of Justice is the judicial branch of the E.U.  
It may review the Commission's procedures in 
imposing fines on an entity, but it cannot assume the 
role of a fact finder.  Therefore, the only issues that 
an entity that has been fined by the Commission can 
                                                 
3 Basic Information on the European Union, EUROPA, 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 
2012).  
4  See The History of the European Union, EUROPA, 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2012). 
5 EU Institutions and Other Bodies, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-
eu/institutions-bodies/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2012).  
6 See European Commission, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-
eu/institutions-bodies/european-commission/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 
11, 2012). 
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bring before the Court of Justice are allegations that 
the Commission violated procedure in reaching its 
decision to impose the fine.  The Court of Justice's 
decision is binding on all E.U. members and all 
entities operating within them.
7
 
Another structural difference between the U.S. and the E.U. is the 
difference between the legal systems of the member states and the role 
of private litigants.  With the exception of the United Kingdom, 
member states of the E.U. use a version of the civil law system.
8
  Civil 
law systems do not employ the extensive discovery methods of 
common law systems.
9
  Consequently, litigants in a civil law system 
must depend on public disclosures, and do not have the power to 
demand access to internal documents as in the U.S.  Conversely, many 
civil law systems do not recognize any privilege over communications 
between in-house attorneys and the employing corporation.
10
  This 
means that where an entity, such as a governmental agency, does have 
the power to demand access to internal documents, those 
communications are not protected.  
B. BACKGROUND: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
PRIVILEGE IN SOUTH CAROLINA 
Before focusing on evidentiary privilege law in the E.U., it may 
be helpful to review the American attorney-client privilege as a point of 
reference.  The attorney-client privilege attaches to communications 
between an attorney and a client where it is “shown that the 
relationship between the parties was that of attorney and client and that 
                                                 
7 Publisher’s Editorial Staff, Operation of the Attorney-Client Privilege in 
the European Union, 18 No. 3 Int’l HR J.Art. 4 n. 1 (2009).  
8 See D. A. O. Edward, THE PROFESSIONAL SECRET, CONFIDENTIALITY 
AND LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE IN THE NINE MEMBER STATES OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 5-6 (1976), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/ 
user_upload/NTCdocument/edward_enpdf1_1182334460.pdf; see also Council 
of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Union, THE PROFESSIONAL 
SECRET, CONFIDENTIALITY AND LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE IN EUROPE 1-2 
(2003), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/NTCdocument/ 
update_edwards_repor1_1182333982.pdf (updating the previous report by D. 
A. O. Edward).  
9 Francesca Giannoni-Crystal, The EU Court’s Decision in Akzo Nobel is 
Not a Big, Bad Wolf, S.C. LAWYER, Jan. 2012, at 15, 17-18.  
10 Id. at 18. 
300 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 8.2 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS 
 
the communications were of a confidential nature.”
11
  In State v. Love, 
the Supreme Court of South Carolina reiterated that,  
[t]his privilege is based upon a wise public policy 
that considers that the interests of society are best 
promoted by inviting the utmost confidence on the 
part of the client in disclosing his secrets to his 
professional advisor, under the pledge of the law that 
such confidence should not be abused by permitting 
disclosure of such communications.
12
  
Corporations in South Carolina almost certainly enjoy the 
attorney-client privilege when communicating with their in-house 
counsel acting in their legal capacity.  In the seminal decision on 
attorney-client privilege in the U.S., the Supreme Court, in Upjohn v. 
United States, affirmed that the policy underlying the attorney-client 
privilege supports extending it to corporations when consulting with 
their in-house counsel.
13
  Although South Carolina has not yet ruled on 
this question directly, the state’s Supreme Court in Ross v. Medical 
University of South Carolina presumed that corporations enjoy the 
attorney-client privilege when communicating with their in-house 
counsel.
14
  Given this law and the stated public policy favoring the 
attorney-client privilege, South Carolina attorneys (whether outside 
counsel or in-house) can operate safe in the knowledge that the legal 
advice that they provide to their domestic clients will be protected. 
C.  OVERVIEW OF CURRENT EUROPEAN UNION PRIVILEGE LAW. 
The legal professional privilege is roughly the European 
continental equivalent of the attorney-client privilege of common law 
jurisdictions.
15
  The scope and application of the legal professional 
privilege varies significantly from country to country.
16
  In Australian 
Mining & Smelting Europe Ltd. v. Commissioner, (A.M. & S.) the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that E.U. supra-national law did 
                                                 
11 Love, 275 S.C. at 59, 271 S.E.2d at 112 (citing 81 AM. JUR. 2D 
Witnesses § 221 (1980)).  
12 Id. (quoting S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Booker, 260 S.C. 245, 254, 
195 S.E.2d 615, 619-20 (1973); note that “Shall” is used in the original case, 
but the court in State v. Love uses “should”). 
13 Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395, 101 S.Ct. 677, 685 (1981).  
14 Ross v. Med. Univ. of S.C., 317 S.C. 377, 383, 453 S.E.2d 880, 884 
(1994).  
15 See EDWARD, supra note 8; see also Council of the Bars and Law 
Societies of the European Union, supra note 8. 
16 Id. 
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recognize an evidentiary privilege.  This professional legal privilege 
protects communications between attorneys and corporations.
17
  A.M. 
& S. defined the privilege as protecting “the confidentiality of written 
communications between lawyer and client” where two requirements 
are met:  first, “the communications are made [pursuant to] the client's 
rights of defence [sic];” and second, the communications are with an 
independent lawyer.
18
  Here, “independent” was defined to mean “not 
bound to the client by a relationship of employment.”
19
 
The rule in A.M. & S. implied that companies operating within the 
E.U. do not retain the legal professional privilege with any person who 
is not a member of an E.U. member state bar or their in-house counsel 
in any area of E.U. regulation.
20
  However, A.M. & S. did not address 
whether bar membership and contractual terms could put sufficient 
distance between an in-house attorney and the corporation such that the 
attorney was not “bound.”
21
  Nearly thirty years later the ECJ answered 
these questions when it promulgated what is now the leading decision 
on legal professional privilege and in-house counsel:  Akzo Nobel 
Chemicals Ltd. v. European Commission.
 22
  
Akzo affirmed the general view that in-house attorneys are 
dependent employees within the E.U. legal structure rather than 
independent attorneys.
23
  Furthermore, the highly influential advisory 
opinion of the Advocate General in Akzo, the reasoning of which was 
adopted by the ECJ opinion, expressly rejected extending legal 
professional privilege to communications with practicing attorneys who 




The decision does 
                                                 
17 Case 155/79 Austl. Mining & Smelting Eur. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1982 
E.C.R. 1575, ¶ 21. 
18 Id. The requirement of the relationship to the client’s “right of defense” 
is beyond the scope of this note and was not at issue in Akzo Nobel. The “right 
of defense” requirement functionally means that the legal professional privilege 
will apply in contexts that are more narrow than those in which the attorney-
privilege will apply. This requirement might be compared to work “in 
anticipation of litigation.” See generally EDWARD, supra note 8; see also 
Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Union, supra note 8.  
19 Id. 
20 See Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 EUR-Lex 
CELEX 62007J0550 (E.C.J. Sept. 14, 2010). 
23 Id. 
24 Opinion of Att’y Gen. Kokott , Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. 
Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 EUR-Lex CELEX 62007CC0550, ¶¶ 188-90 (Apr. 29, 
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not limit itself to competition regulation,
25
 and it carries at least some 
weight as precedent for future cases.
26
  Additionally, subsequent non-
competition authority has relied upon Akzo.  In European Renewable 
Energies Federation ASBL v. European Commission, a procedural case 
decided independent of competition law, the ECJ cited Akzo for its 
conception of in-house attorneys as dependent employees.
27
  
Furthermore, the statutory language interpreted in Akzo is not unique, 
and expansive application of the principles of Akzo is very possible 
where equivalent language appears in other statutes.
28
  Also, given the 
structure of European regulation schemes, Akzo’s principles could 
easily be applied across the body of E.U. regulatory systems.
29
 
D.  THE AKZO DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
Taken together, ECJ jurisprudence holds that enterprises 
operating within the E.U. certainly do not enjoy legal professional 
privilege with their in-house counsel, at least in competition 
investigations, and probably not in any other regulatory area either.  
Additionally, enterprises may not enjoy legal professional privilege 
with an outside attorney who is not a member of an E.U. member state 
bar in the same areas.  
1.  BACKGROUND TO AKZO: AUSTRALIAN MINING & SMELTING 
The ECJ first considered the applicability of legal professional 
privilege in European Commission (Commission) competition 
investigations in A.M & S.
30
  The court in A.M. & S. considered a 
demand in the course of a Commission competition investigation for 
access to documents that Australian Mining & Smelting claimed were 
protected by legal professional privilege.
31
  The Commission conducted 
the investigation under Article 14 of Council Regulation No. 17, which 
as then written, empowered the Commission to conduct “such 
                                                                                                 
2010), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
CELEX:62007CC0550:EN:HTML (last visited May 1, 2012). 
25 Akzo, Case C-550/07 P, ¶¶ 40-51. 
26 See discussion infra Part I.3.C. 
27 Case C-74/10, European Renewable Energies Fed’n v. European 
Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. 00000, ¶¶ 52-53. 
28 Akzo, Case C-550/07 P, ¶ 2. For similar language in other statutes, see 
discussion infra Part I.4.  
29 See discussion infra Part I.4.  
30 Case 155/79 Austl. Mining & Smelting Eur. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1982 
E.C.R. 1575.  
31 Id. at ¶ 1. 
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investigations ‘as are necessary.’”
32
  The Commission argued that its 
broad investigative powers under Article 14 superseded any nationally 
recognized legal professional privilege and entitled it to access the 
contested documents.
33
  The ECJ rejected this argument, instead 
recognizing that there was a principle common to all member states 
protecting written communications pursuant to the right of defense 
between clients and “independent lawyers, that is to say, lawyers who 
are not bound to the client by a relationship of employment.”
34
  After 
the decision in A.M. & S., it became apparent that the ECJ 
distinguished between in-house counsel and outside attorneys when 
determining the applicability of the legal professional privilege.  
2. THE AKZO DECISION 
Nearly thirty years after A.M. & S., the ECJ revisited the question 
of legal professional privilege in competition investigations in Akzo.
35
  
In Akzo, the court considered whether legal professional privilege 
extended to, inter alia, emails between a general manager and an 
attorney in the company’s legal department that were seized in the 
course of a Commission competition investigation.
36
 The attorney was 
enrolled as an Advocaat of the Netherlands bar, and Dutch national law 
accorded the protection of its legal professional privilege to the 
communications.
37
  Nonetheless, the Akzo court held that legal 
professional privilege did not apply.
38
  The ECJ affirmed that legal 
professional privilege applied only to “independent” attorneys, and 
reasoned that an attorney’s independence is determined both positively, 
by bar membership and concomitant responsibilities and disciplinary 
                                                 
32 Id. at ¶ 15, (quoting Commission Regulation 204/62, 1959-1962 O.J. 
SPEC. ED. 87.). 
33 Id. at ¶ 10. 
34 Id. at ¶ 21. 
35 Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 EUR-Lex 
CELEX 62007J0550 (E.C.J. Sept. 14, 2010). 
36 Id. ¶¶ 3, 8. 
37 Id. ¶¶ 8, 35-36; see JOHN FISH, REGULATED LEGAL PROFESSIONALS AND 
PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE EUROPEAN 
ECONOMIC AREA AND SWITZERLAND, AND CERTAIN OTHER EUROPEAN 
JURISDICTIONS 39-41 (2004), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/ 
user_upload/NTCdocument/fish_report_enpdf1_1184145269.pdf (review of 
Dutch legal professional privilege between an in-house attorney and client 
corporation). 
38 Akzo, Case C-550/07 P, ¶ 122. 
304 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 8.2 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS 
 




Under this rationale, the Akzo court held that in-house counsel 
could never be independent, even if they were admitted to a national 
bar, because they are salaried by their client corporations and intimately 
involved with their operations.
40
  While A.M. & S. had implied this 
result,
41
 the Akzo court judicially confirmed the presumption.  
Furthermore, although the Akzo court specifically interpreted E.U. 
competition Article 14 of Council Regulation No. 17,
42
 the ECJ did not 
limit its decision to competition law only.
43
  
Additionally, the advisory opinion of the Advocate General in 
Akzo suggests that legal professional privilege does not extend to 
practicing outside attorneys who are not members of an E.U. member 
state bar.
44
  The Advocate General is a legal professional tasked with 
assessing the claims of the parties to a case before the ECJ, 
investigating the applicable law, and issuing an advisory opinion to the 
Court proposing a holding.
45
  The Advocate General’s opinion is non-
binding but highly influential.
46
  In her opinion in Akzo, Advocate 
General Kokott expressly rejected extending legal professional 
privilege to communications with practicing attorneys who were not 
members of an E.U. member state bar:
 47
 
[W]ith third countries there is, generally speaking, no 
adequate basis for the mutual recognition of legal 
qualifications and professional ethical obligations to 
                                                 
39 Id. ¶¶ 42-45. 
40 Id. ¶¶ 47-49. 
41 Case 155/79 Austl. Mining & Smelting Eur. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1982 
E.C.R. 1575.  
42 Commission Regulation 204/62, 1959-1962 O.J. SPEC. ED. 87, amended 
by Council Regulation 1/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 14. 
43 Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 EUR-Lex 
CELEX 62007J0550 (E.C.J. Sept. 14, 2010). 
44 Opinion of Att’y Gen. Kokott , Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. 
Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 EUR-Lex CELEX 62007CC0550, ¶¶ 188-90 (Apr. 29, 
2010). 
45 Protocol (No. 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, art. 49, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 210.  
46 Pinset Masons, Adidas Did Not Suffer Trade Mark Dilution, Says 
Advocate General, OUT-LAW.COM (Jul. 16, 2003), http://www.out-
law.com/page-3731 (“The Advocate General's opinion is highly influential and 
usually followed by the Court.”). 
47 Opinion of Att’y Gen. Kokott, Akzo, Case C-550/07 P, ¶¶ 189-90.  
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which lawyers are subject in the exercise of their 
profession. In many cases, it would not even be 
possible to ensure that the third country in question 
has a sufficiently established rule-of-law tradition 
which would enable lawyers to exercise their 
profession in the independent manner required and 




While the Advocate General’s discussion focused on in-house 
attorneys, her opinion did not restrict the reasoning only to employed 
attorneys, and notes that legal professional privilege applies only where 
attorneys operate “as collaborators in the administration of justice.”
49
  
The ECJ did not specifically address this point but did affirm Kokott’s 
framing of the issues, her reasoning, and her results.
50
  This implies, at 
a minimum, there is some question as to whether legal professional 
privilege would extend even to an outside attorney who is not a 
member of an E.U. member state bar, especially where the attorney’s 
bar conceives of the attorney’s role as more adversarial than that 
described in Advocate General Kokott’s opinion in Akzo.
51
  
Therefore, Akzo clearly allows the Commission in the course of a 
competition investigation to access all correspondence or other 
documents passing between an in-house attorney and the client 
corporation that are not made by or to outside counsel pursuant to the 
right of defense.  Given that the opinion of AG Kokott expressly 
rejected extending legal professional privilege to communications with 
practicing attorneys who were not members of an E.U. member state 
bar,
52
 the same might be true of communications passing between such 
outside attorneys and the client corporation.  This is true even if 
identical correspondence with outside European counsel would be 
covered by legal professional privilege.  Furthermore, because there 
                                                 
48 Id. ¶ 190. 
49 Id. 
50 Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 EUR-Lex 
CELEX 62007J0550 (E.C.J. Sept. 14, 2010). 
51 See European Court of Justice Confirms That in-House Legal Advice Is 
Not Protected By Legal Privilege, Corporate Legal Update, MAYER BROWN 
(Sept. 2010), http://www.mayerbrown.com/london/article.asp?id=9638&nid 
=369 (concluding from this language that “it is clear that communications 
between clients and external counsel who are members of a bar or law society 
in a third country will, as is presently the case, not attract legal professional 
privilege”).  
52 Akzo, Case C-550/07 P, ¶ 90.  
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was no language in Akzo limiting the decision to competition 
investigations, Akzo could be applied similarly in any other E.U. 
regulatory case.  Thus, companies subject to E.U. law probably do not 
retain the legal professional privilege with their in-house counsel or 
attorneys who are not members of E.U. member state bars in any 
regulatory area. 
3.  PRECEDENTIAL VALUE OF ECJ DECISIONS:  THERE’S ROOM FOR 
DEBATE, BUT THE ECJ EXPECTS ATTORNEYS TO PAY ATTENTION 
The ECJ decision in Akzo carries at least some precedential 
weight for future jurisprudence.  
ECJ decisions carry more precedential weight than decisions in 
continental civil-law systems while perhaps not quite as much as 
decisions in common-law systems.
53
  At a minimum, ECJ decisions 
provide guidance as to the probable outcome of future cases.
54
  Also, 
ECJ opinions cite to previous opinions of that court as support for its 
reasoning and holdings,
55
 implying that the court sees its decisions as 
having weight for its own jurisprudence beyond the case under 
consideration.  
Furthermore, the ECJ has indicated that it expects its decisions on 
E.U. law to be binding upon future cases of E.U. law before national 
courts.
56
  C.I.L.F.I.T. v Ministry of Health considered whether the 
highest Italian court was required to submit a case to the European 
courts in order to comply with Italy’s treaty obligations as a member of 
the European Community.
57
  In C.I.L.F.I.T., the Italian court believed 
that E.U. law clearly disposed of the issue, but one of the parties 
attempted to raise a question of interpretation of the law.
58
  The ECJ 
held that a national court is not required to submit a case based upon 
E.U. law where the court “has established . . . that the [E.U.] provision 
in question has already been interpreted by the Court of Justice.”
59
  
This suggests that the ECJ expects its decisions to have at least some 
precedential bearing on future cases.  
                                                 
53 See Richard L. Merpi II, Note, The Lisbon Treaty and EU Treaty-
Making Power: The Next Evolutionary Step and Its Effects on Member States 
and Third-Party Nations, 56 WAYNE L. REV. 795, 800 n.42 (2010).   
54 Id. 
55 See Akzo, Case C-550/07 P. 
56 C.I.L.F.I.T. v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415, 3431-32 
(authentic language Italian). 
57 Id. at 3418-19. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 3431-32. 
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E.  SUBSEQUENT NON-COMPETITION AUTHORITY RELYING UPON AKZO: 
BROAD APPLICATIONS MEAN BROAD IMPLICATIONS 
The holding in Akzo cannot be restricted to competition law 
alone, and even shortly after the decision the ECJ demonstrated that 
broad application of Akzo’s principles is both possible and logical.  The 
ECJ extensively cited Akzo in European Renewable Energies 
Federation ASBL v. European Commission (EREF) for its conception 
of in-house attorneys as dependent employees.
60
  Although the original 
actions arose out of state aid decisions (arguably resembling a 
competition case), EREF was a procedural case, and the opinion did not 
address competition law.
61
  In EREF, the Federation brought two 
actions to annul Commission decisions.  The Federation held that 
certain methods of national financing for the construction of nuclear 
power plants constituted improper state aid.
62
  A lawyer who also 
served as director of the Federation brought the applications for 
annulment.
63
  The General Court, however, rejected the application 
asserting that the lawyer was barred from representing EREF because 
the Federation employed her.
64
  The General Court’s premise was 
based on the procedural grounds; Article 19 of the Statute of the Court 
of Justice of the E.U. requires that parties be “represented” by a lawyer 
before European courts.
65
  On appeal, the ECJ affirmed the lower 
court’s holding that an attorney employed by a company could not 
practice before the European courts, and relied upon A.M. & S. and 
Akzo in its opinion dismissing the appeal:  
[T]he requirement as to the position and status as an 
independent lawyer is based on a conception of the 
lawyer’s role as collaborating in the administration of 
justice of the [E.U.]. . . . [Akzo held] that the 
requirement of independence of a lawyer implies that 
there must be no employment relationship between 
the lawyer and his client.
66
  
                                                 
60 Case C-74/10, Eur’n Renewable Energies Fed’n v. Eur’n Comm’n, 
2010 E.C.R. 00000, ¶¶ 52-53.   
61 Id. ¶¶ 12-14, 16. 
62 Id. ¶¶ 1, 6. 
63 Id. ¶ 7. 
64 Id. ¶¶ 12-18 (citing 2010 O.J. (C 83) 210 at 214).  
65 Id. 
66 Eur’n Renewable Energies Fed’n, Case C-74/10, ¶¶ 52-53 (citing Case 
155/79, Austl. Mining & Smelting Eur. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1982 E.C.R. 1575, ¶ 
24; Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 EUR-Lex 
CELEX 62007J0550, ¶ 42 (E.C.J. Sept. 14, 2010)). 
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Additionally, the opinion never addressed any issues of corporate 
personhood in connection with an attorney’s status as a director of the 
enterprise, but instead focused on the attorney’s status as an 
employee.
67
  Stated simply, in EREF, the ECJ reiterated its support for 
the proposition that lawyers employed by corporations would not be 
treated as independent attorneys before European courts.
68
  
Furthermore, EREF demonstrated that Akzo’s conception of in-
house attorneys as dependent employees rather than independent 
attorneys is not confined to competition law, and presumably the same 
would apply by analogy to attorneys who are not members of an E.U. 
member state bar.  This extension and reiteration of Akzo shows that the 
decision could easily serve as authority for the Commission to ignore 
an individual nation’s recognized legal professional privilege between 
in-house counsel, foreign attorneys, and the client corporation in any 
regulatory area.  
F. ROOM FOR FURTHER EXPANSION:  SIMILAR STATUTES AND LEGAL 
FRAMEWORKS PERMIT BROAD AKZO APPLICATION 
Further expansion of Akzo is also possible because the statutory 
clause interpreted in that case is not unique.  The Commission could 
push to grant itself similar powers in any regulatory area. Akzo 
interpreted Article 14 of Council Regulation No. 17, which reads in 
relevant part:  “In carrying out the duties assigned to it . . . , the 
Commission may undertake all necessary investigations into 
undertakings [i.e. businesses] and associations of undertakings.”
69
  
Akzo clarified that this E.U.-level statutory grant of power to the 
Commission superseded nationally recognized legal professional 
privilege between attorneys and a client corporation where the 
attorneys were not outside counsel who were members of an E.U. 
member state bar.
70
  A simple search of E.U. legislation on Eur-Lex for 
the term “all necessary investigations” reveals that E.U. law grants 
power to the Commission or national bodies to perform “all necessary 
investigations” in a mergers and acquisitions directive,
71
 “Ecolabel” 
                                                 
67 Id. ¶¶ 49-51. 
68 Id. ¶¶ 52-53 (citing Austl. Mining & Smelting Eur., Case 155/79, ¶ 24; 
Akzo, Case C-550/07 P, ¶ 42).  
69 Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 EUR-Lex 
CELEX 62007J0550, ¶ 2 (E.C.J. Sept. 14, 2010), interpreting 1962 O.J. (13) 
204, amended by 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1 at 14. 
70 Id. ¶ 114-15. 
71 2011 O.J. (L 110) 1 art. 10 ¶ 3.  
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environmental product labeling regulation,
72
 air traffic control 
regulation,
73
 and a veterinary check on imported products directive.
74
  
Additionally, other regulations that may not so directly empower the 
Commission still may be written in ways that permit overriding public 
interests to supersede confidentiality considerations.
75
  
In light of these legislative grants, it appears that Akzo could be 
applied as authority for the proposition that the power to conduct “all 
necessary investigations” trumps nationally recognized legal 
professional privilege between a corporation and an in-house attorney 
under any of these legislative acts.  While this note does not undertake 
a study of E.U. governmental institutions, expansion through similar 
grants of language seems especially possible given that the European 
Commission is the primary governmental organ charged with writing, 
proposing, interpreting, and enforcing E.U.-level legislation.
76
  Thus, 
further extension of Akzo also is possible through interpretation of 
existing legislation.  
Another possible area of application of Akzo’s principles in E.U. 
law might be corporate governance regulation.  Under Directive 
2006/46/EC (Directive), the E.U. directed its member states to 
accomplish several corporate governance goals.
77
  As explained by the 
“Study on Monitoring and Enforcement Practices in Corporate 
Governance in the Member States” (Study), 
[n]ational corporate governance codes lay down rules 
or recommendations that are not mandatory, but with 
which companies must either comply, or explain 
deviations . . . . [The Directive] mandates the 
application of corporate governance codes by way of 
comply-or-explain – or alternatively allows the 
                                                 
72 2010 O.J. (L 27) 1 art. 10 ¶ 3. 
73 2008 O.J. (L 79) 1 art. 55 ¶ 1.  
74 1998 O.J. (L 24) 9 art. 24 ¶ 1.  
75 Cf. Opinion of Att’y Gen. Kokott, Case C-524/09, Ville de Lyon v. 
Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations, CELEX 62009C0524, ¶ 98 (Oct. 14, 2010) 
(Comparing two potentially conflicting Directives: “the confidentiality of 
commercial information . . . may be outweighed only by overriding interests 
deserving protection.”).  
76 See European Commission, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu 
/institutions-bodies/european-commission/index_en.htm (last visited May 1, 
2012).  
77 2006 O.J. (L 224) 1. 
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The Study indicated that internal control and risk management 
measures are generally regulated by national codes, which it 
characterized as being “regularly updated” and “flexible but also living 
instruments, which adapt to changing legal, economic, and social 
realities.”
79
  This malleable framework allows member states the 
flexibility to permit sweeping investigative powers while aligning with 
general Directive principles.  While it is unclear whether courts would 
treat such a national regulation written pursuant to an E.U.-level 
Directive in the same manner as a Commission regulation, in theory 
such a scheme could open the door for regulatory authorities to apply 
Akzo as supra-national authority
80
 in seeking materials that otherwise 
would be protected by the legal professional privilege.  Indeed, the ECJ 
most likely will consider this question eventually as E.U.-wide 
legislation and ECJ opinions become an increasingly significant part of 
the E.U. project as a whole, which is characterized as a “work in 
progress,”
81
 with the courts having a reputation as being a driving force 
for unification.
82
  Accordingly, corporate governance regulation is 
another potential area of Akzo application. 
In summary, it should be clear that supra-national E.U. law does 
not attach evidentiary privileges to some communications that an 
American practitioner would expect to be covered by the attorney-
client privilege.  Also, questions remain as to whether the privilege 
attaches to any communications from attorneys licensed outside of the 
                                                 
78 RISK METRICS GROUP ET AL., STUDY ON MONITORING AND 
ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE MEMBER STATES 
11 (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ 
ecgforum/studies/comply-or-explain-090923_en.pdf (comparing how member 
states implemented the Directive).  
79 Id.  
80 Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd v. Comm’n, EUR-Lex 
CELEX 62007J0550, ¶ 119 (E.C.J. Sept. 14, 2010) (supremacy of EU 
supranational directives over conflicting national legal rules).  
81 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR PRESS AND 
COMMUNICATION, KEY FACTS AND FIGURES ABOUT THE EUROPEAN UNION 
(2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/eu_glance/44/en-
1.pdf.  
82 Stephanie Bier, The European Court of Justice and Member State 
Relations: A Constructivist Analysis of the European Legal Order (May 2008) 
(unpublished paper) (presented at First Annual Graduate Student Conference 
on International Relations, May 14, 2008), available at 
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/irconf/papers/bier.pdf.  
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E.U.  Additionally, as the law in this area evolves, it remains to be seen 
just how broadly the reasoning of Akzo will be applied both at the 
national and the supra-national level. This evolution could have a 
particular significance for attorneys who practice internationally while 
licensed in states that do not view attorneys primarily as “collaborators 




II.  PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR A SOUTH CAROLINA 
PRACTITIONER:  FOREWARNED IS FOREARMED 
A.  SUMMARY OF PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR A SOUTH CAROLINA 
PRACTITIONER 
In light of the disparate treatment by E.U. privilege law of 
communications from lawyers who are and are not members of E.U. 
member state bars, and any in-house attorney, it should be clear that 
domestic practitioners must exercise a great deal of caution when 
working with international clients with exposure to E.U. jurisdiction.  
Domestic attorneys must be aware that the attorney-client privilege 
may not attach to communications that are accessible to the European 
Commission in an investigation.  South Carolina attorneys must be 
aware that, because South Carolina courts have not addressed this 
conflict of laws question directly, the attorney-client privilege may be 
susceptible to attack even in a court of this state under certain 
conditions.  
B.  WHAT KIND OF COMMUNICATION MIGHT BE INVOLVED? 
Given that South Carolina law and stated public policy uphold the 
attorney-client privilege,
84
 South Carolina in-house attorneys can 
operate safe in the knowledge that the legal advice that they provide to 
their employing corporations operating only in the U.S. will be 
protected by the privilege.  However, what about advice to corporations 
that are not purely domestic? 
Returning to the example given at the beginning of this note, 
suppose that a corporate entity operating in both South Carolina and 
Germany employs an attorney at the company’s South Carolina 
headquarters.  The general counsel based in Munich, Germany, e-mails 
the South Carolina in-house attorney and seeks a legal opinion as a 
                                                 
83 Opinion of Att’y Gen. Kokott , Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. 
Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 EUR-Lex CELEX 62007CC0550, ¶ 190 (Apr. 29, 
2010). 
84 Love, 275 S.C. 55, 271 S.E.2d 110.  
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component of the development of a comprehensive strategy to increase 
global market share.  (Compare this scenario to the situations in A.M. & 
S. and Akzo, where in each case major enterprises were the subject of 
anti-trust investigations by the European Commission.)
85
  The South 
Carolina attorney replies in an email that contains the legal opinion and 
never questions whether the attorney-client privilege attached to the 
communication.  A copy of the email is stored on the client’s server in 
Munich and on the corporate counsel’s computer. 
C. CROSS-BORDER COMMUNICATION UNDER E.U.-LEVEL LEGAL 
PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE LAW 
Under Akzo, there is no question that if the European Commission 
opened a competition investigation, and probably any other 
investigation, into the activities of the corporate client the Commission 
could rightfully demand a copy of the email.
86
  The Commission might 
even seize the general counsel’s computer or the entire server in a dawn 
raid, similar to the raid where the Commission seized the 
communications at issue in Akzo.
87
  
D. SOUTH CAROLINA COURTS AND LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE  
How a South Carolina court would assess a challenged assertion 
of attorney-client privilege over a cross-border communication with a 
European client is an open question.  At least, a court of this state 
probably would find that a communication seized in the course of a 
Commission investigation ceased to be confidential, and therefore the 
attorney-client privilege no longer applied.
88
  Additionally, a litigant 
could challenge an assertion of privilege on the theory that E.U. 
privilege law controls the treatment of the communication.
89
  Although 
presence in a South Carolina forum probably would dictate that South 
Carolina evidentiary rules applied, this scenario presents a conflict of 
laws question
90
 that our courts have not yet answered.  Finally, a 
litigant could assert that the confidentiality requirement of the privilege 
                                                 
85  See generally Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd v. Comm’n, 
EUR-Lex CELEX 62007J0550, ¶ 119 (E.C.J. Sept. 14, 2010); see also Case 
155/79, Austl. Mining & Smelting Eur. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1982 E.C.R. 1575. 
86 Akzo, Case C-550/07 P, ¶¶ 120-22. 
87 Id. ¶ 3.2. 
88 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 362 (2011) (“the privilege evaporates the 
moment that confidentiality ceases to exist.”). 
89 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 (2011). 
90 See infra Part II.4-B (comparing the approaches of RESTATEMENT 
(FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 597 (2011) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 (2011)). 
2012] THE PRIVILEGE STOPS AT THE BORDER, EVEN IF 313  
 A COMMUNICATION KEEPS GOING 
 
was not met, and therefore the attorney-client privilege never 
attached.
91
  None of these theories would necessarily succeed, but each 
of them could be asserted credibly. 
1.  DESTRUCTION OF THE PRIVILEGE BY DISCLOSURE TO THE 
COMMISSION 
First, a South Carolina court reasonably could find that a 
communication seized in the course of a Commission investigation 
ceased to be confidential, and, therefore, that the attorney-client 
privilege no longer applied.  The South Carolina Supreme Court, in 
State v. Love, cited American Jurisprudence (Second) for its rule 
statement that in order for the privilege to exist, “it must be shown that 
the relationship between the parties was that of attorney and client and 
that the communications were of a confidential nature.”
92
  American 
Jurisprudence 2d also states that, “the privilege evaporates the moment 
that confidentiality ceases to exist.”
93
  A communication intentionally 
disclosed to the European Commission, even under legal compulsion, 
can no longer be considered confidential.  Therefore, it follows that the 
attorney-client privilege evaporates at the time of the disclosure to the 
Commission.
94
  Although a South Carolina court might seek a different 
result on other grounds, perhaps as a matter of public policy,
95
 such a 
court could reasonably find that the attorney-client privilege no longer 
applied under these standards.  
2. CHALLENGING PRIVILEGE BASED ON E.U. LAW 
Second, even if a cross-border communication has not been 
disclosed to the European Commission, the privileged nature of a 
communication still might reasonably be challenged under the theory 
that the law controlling any privilege over the communication is E.U.-
level evidentiary privilege law and not the law of the local forum.  This 
challenge would present a novel conflict of laws question for this state. 
However, South Carolina would probably adopt the approach dictating 
                                                 
91 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 71 
(2011) (describing confidentiality requirement as a prerequisite to attachment 
of the attorney-client privilege). 
92 Love, 275 S.C. at 59, 271 S.E.2d at 112 (citing 81 AM. JUR. 2D 
Witnesses § 221 (1980)). 
93 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 362 (2011). 
94 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 71 
(2011) (describing confidentiality requirement as a prerequisite to attachment 
of the attorney-client privilege). 
95 Love, 275 S.C. at 59, 271 S.E.2d at 112. (quoting S.C. State Highway 
Dep’t v. Booker, 260 S.C. 245, 254, 195 S.E.2d 615, 619-20 (1973)). 
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that South Carolina law would control; but even if it did not, it still 
could uphold the privilege on policy grounds.  Thus, E.U.-level 
evidentiary privilege law probably could not directly control the 
determination of the attachment of the attorney-client privilege in a 
South Carolina court. 
Where a party challenges the admissibility of evidence based on 
the laws of another forum, the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws
96
 
and the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
97
 set out two 
different approaches to this question that result in two different 
outcomes.  The Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws takes a strict 
territoriality approach to the question of the admissibility of evidence, 
stating simply that “[t]he law of the forum determines the admissibility 
of a particular piece of evidence.”
98
  Nationally, this is now the 
minority view among states that either have considered the question or 
have signaled how they might approach the question.
99
  Under the 
Restatement (First) approach, the attorney-client privilege is treated as 
procedural law.  As such, a forum always applies its own local law.   
Under this approach, the law of the state court would control a 
challenge to the attorney-client privilege, rather than the legal 
professional privilege law of the E.U.  
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws adopts the “most 
significant relationship test,”
100
 which is the majority rule now among 
states, and classifies the attorney-client privilege as a substantive 
question.
101
  The Restatement (Second) pronounces:  
Evidence that is not privileged under the local law of 
the state which has the most significant relationship 
with the communication will be admitted, even 
though it would be privileged under the local law of 
the forum, unless the admission of such evidence 




                                                 
96 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 597 (2011). 
97 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 (2011). 
98 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 597 (2011). 
99 E. Todd Presnell & James A. Beakes, The Application of Conflict of 
Laws to Evidentiary Privileges, in EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES FOR CORPORATE 
COUNSEL 157, 162-67 (DRI, 2008), available at http://www.mondaq.in/ 
unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=66318.  
100 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139(1) (1971). 
101 Presnell & Beakes, supra note 99.  
102 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139(1) (1971). 
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Under the Restatement (Second) approach, if an E.U. member-state had 
the “most significant relationship” with the communication, both the 
national law of the member state and E.U. legal professional privilege 
law logically would apply.  
A hypothetical illustration may help clarify the two alternative 
approaches.  Suppose that a litigant in South Carolina sought to 
discover and admit into evidence an email sent from the general 
counsel of Acme, S.A. to the president of the company.  Both the 
general counsel and the president work in Paris, France. The email was 
sent and received under circumstances that would normally satisfy 
South Carolina standards for the attorney-client privilege to attach, but 
would not satisfy French and E.U. standards for the legal professional 
privilege to attach.  The email was “carbon copied” to the general 
counsel of a branch office in South Carolina, and the local attorney 
responded to the discovery request by asserting that the communication 
was protected by the attorney-client privilege.  Under the Restatement 
(First), a South Carolina court would apply the procedural law of the 
forum, which would mandate that the attorney-client privilege applied 
to the communication.
103
  Conversely, French and the E.U. privilege 
law would apply, under the Restatement (Second) approach, because 
France and the E.U. would have the “most significant relationship” to 
the communication.
104
  Under this analysis, the email would not be 




South Carolina has not decided which of the two conflicting 
approaches it would apply, and other states have decided the 
fundamental question in two different ways.
106
  The Fourth Circuit in 
Rawls Auto Auction Sales v. Dick Herriman Ford Inc. predicted that 
South Carolina would likely follow the Restatement (First) approach of 
territoriality.
107
  This prediction was confirmed by the South Carolina 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Lister v. NationsBank where the Court 
stated, “South Carolina has not adopted the modern choice of law test 
found in the Restatement [Second].”
108
  Nonetheless, the Court 
immediately proceeded to “hold that if the Restatement [Second] test 
were applied . . . South Carolina is the place with the ‘most significant 
                                                 
103 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 597 (2011). 
104 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139(1) (1971). 
105 Id. 
106 Presnell & Beakes, supra note 99. 
107 Rawls Auto Auction Sales v. Dick Herriman Ford Inc., 690 F.2d 422, 
427 (4th Cir. 1982). 
108 Lister v. NationsBank, 329 S.C. 133, 145, 494 S.E.2d 449, 456 (1997). 
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relationship’ . . . .”
109
  The Lister Court then engaged in a lengthy 
discussion applying the Restatement (Second) approach to the facts of 
the case.
110
 This appears to leave the door open to the application of the 
Restatement (Second) in South Carolina.  Furthermore, the South 
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure contemplate that foreign law will 
control the substantive rulings of some proceedings, and the Rules give 
state courts the authority to determine and apply that law as required.
111
 
Although South Carolina is a Restatement (First) state, the 
Supreme Court left the door open to the application of the Restatement 
(Second) in future cases.  But three factors point toward a South 
Carolina court upholding the attorney-client privilege in the face of a 
challenge based on E.U. legal professional privilege law.  First, the 
Fourth Circuit prediction that South Carolina likely would follow the 
Restatement (First) approach is probably correct.  Second, even if 
South Carolina did elect to adopt the Restatement (Second) approach in 
a situation where a litigant challenged the privileged nature of a 
communication under the substantial relation test, admission of the 
communication would still “be contrary to the strong public policy of 
the forum.”
112
  South Carolina rules do contemplate that foreign law 
will control a state court’s decision in at least some cases,
113
 so it would 
be reasonable and proper for a South Carolina court to apply 
supranational E.U. law if it believed the situation so required. Also, 
national law of the E.U. member state may not recognize any privilege 
over the communication,
114
 meaning that the privilege could similarly 
be challenged on the basis of national law independent of E.U.-level 
privilege law. But the stated policy of South Carolina favoring the 
attorney-client privilege nevertheless should trump application of a 
foreign law that does not recognize the privilege.
115
  
Third, a party seeking disclosure of the privileged information 
would argue that the power of the Commission to legally demand 
production of the emailed communication in any investigation defeats 
reasonable expectation of privacy.
116
 However, it would be difficult for 
                                                 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 146-48, 494 S.E.2d at 456-57. 
111 S.C. R. CIV. P. 44(d). 
112 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 (2011). 
113 S.C. R. CIV. P. 44(d). 
114 See generally EDWARD, supra note 8; see also Council of the Bars and 
Law Societies of the European Union, supra note 8. 
115  Love, 275 S.C. at 59, 271 S.E.2d at 112. 
116 Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd v. Comm’n, EUR-Lex 
CELEX 62007J0550, ¶ 119 (E.C.J. Sept. 14, 2010).  
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the typical non-governmental litigant, not having been given such 
authority, to challenge an assertion of attorney-client privilege in a 
South Carolina court on this theory alone.  
3. CHALLENGING PRIVILEGE BASED ON SOUTH CAROLINA LAW 
A third, and possibly more successful, challenge to attaching the 
attorney-client privilege to a cross-border communication with a client 
is that the “confidentiality” requirement of the attorney-client privilege 
in South Carolina could be defeated by the knowledge that the 
communication cannot be expected to remain confidential.  
As stated in State v. Love, the attorney-client privilege attaches 
only to communications “of a confidential nature.”
117
 Since 
confidentiality is a basic prerequisite under South Carolina law for the 
privilege to attach, a showing that the cross-border communication 
could never be confidential in a European Commission investigation 
might render it admissible. The Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers § 71 supports this reasoning where it explains that 
confidentiality requires a reasonable belief “that no one will learn the 
contents of the communication except a privileged person . . . or 
another person with whom communications are protected under a 
similar privilege.”
118
 Akzo confirmed that the European Commission 
has ready access on demand to communications to companies from 
their in-house attorneys; therefore, no such attorney can reasonably 
believe that their communications to these companies actually will be 
confidential as contemplated by the Restatement. Under this approach, 
the privilege never attached to the communication in the first place, and 
therefore the communication is not protected. 
Of course, both the attorney and the corporate client in the 
example above intended the cross-border communication to be secret 
and confidential. The key to the success of this theory would be to 
convince a state court to distinguish between the desire that the 
information remain undiscovered and the reasonable expectation that 
the information remain undiscovered. Under the Restatement, a litigant 
would have a strong argument that the communication between the 
hypothetical lawyer and the client could not properly be considered 
confidential, because it could never be withheld from the European 
Commission in the course of an investigation. Given that this theory 
relies primarily upon South Carolina law for the substantive privilege 
                                                 
117 Love, 275 S.C. at 59, 271 S.E.2d at 112 (citing 81 AM. JUR. 2d 
Witnesses § 221 (1980)). 
118 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 71 (2011). 
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rules and upon E.U.-level legal professional privilege law only for 
circumstantial facts and reasonable expectations, this theory has a 
serious chance of success in a South Carolina court.  
But even given this chance of success, a South Carolina court 
probably still would find that the privilege applies to the 
communication. First, the average litigant in a South Carolina court 
does not have the broad power of seizure that the Commission has. 
Therefore, even if the Commission could seize the communication, this 
does not necessarily mean that anyone else could access the 
communication. Second, a South Carolina court probably would find 
that where the communications had not yet been seized, those 
documents had not yet been exposed to the public. Therefore, the 
confidentiality had not been destroyed. Finally, even where the 
documents had been seized, a South Carolina court could uphold the 
privilege based on the reasonable expectation that the communications 
would remain private at least in South Carolina fora.  
4.  RESORT TO TREATIES: DEFERENCE TO LOCAL RULES 
Treaties tend to preserve, rather than resolve, the conflicts 
inherent in the treatment of evidence in international law by deferring 
to local law. The most significant treaty on international evidence rules, 
the Hague Convention, focuses on the acquisition of evidence across 
international borders.
119
 The Convention remains silent on the 
treatment of evidence and the preservation of any privileges once that 
evidence is in international legal fora.
120
 Insofar as the Convention does 
address evidentiary privileges, it is only to require that international 
requests for evidence be executed in compliance with local rules.
121
 
Practically speaking, this means that the attorney-client privilege would 
be protected in international discovery requests. All other conflicts of 
law issues are left to local fora.   
E. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS AND PROBLEM SOLVING:  WHAT THIS 
MEANS FOR SOUTH CAROLINA ATTORNEYS WITH INTERNATIONAL 
EXPOSURE 
In light of Akzo and its implications, in-house attorneys that 
advise corporate clients with E.U. exposure must exercise a heightened 
level of caution in terms of confidentiality. Also, these practitioners 
                                                 
119 Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or 
Commercial Matters art. 9, opened for signature Mar. 18,1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 
847 U.N.T.S. 231. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
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must be prepared to defend the attorney-client privilege in a court of 
this state based not just on the black-letter requirements of attachment, 




First, practitioners should not assume that evidentiary privileges 
would attach to their communications to and from clients in E.U. 
member states, even if an identical communication with a domestic 
client would be privileged. Domestic practitioners in situations where 
such communication is required may wish to coordinate with and 
communicate through local outside counsel licensed to practice law in a 
E.U. member state. While this is often an expensive and cumbersome 
process for both the client and the domestic attorney, it appears to be 
the only safe way to ensure that cross-border communication will be 
truly privileged.  
Once more, a hypothetical illustration may help clarify by 
returning to the example of a corporate client, operating in both South 
Carolina and at least one E.U. member state, which employs an 
attorney at the company’s South Carolina headquarters. The general 
counsel based in Munich, Germany, emails the South Carolina in-house 
attorney and seeks a legal opinion as a component of the development 
of a comprehensive strategy to increase global market share. Under 
these circumstances, the wisest course of action would be to retain 
outside counsel who is licensed to practice law in a jurisdiction of the 
E.U.
123
 If this is not a viable option, the next best course of action is to 
have a phone conversation to relay the answer, rather than transmitting 
a written document into a jurisdiction where it will not be privileged 
from seizure and use in an investigation.  
Next, practitioners must be prepared to defend the attorney-client 
privilege in a court of this state based on the public policy of this state 
favoring the privilege.
124
 Because civil law systems do not engage in 
the type and degree of discovery practice of common-law systems, it is 
unlikely that a South Carolina attorney will be faced with a discovery 
                                                 
122 Love, 275 S.C. at 59, 271 S.E.2d at 112. 
123 Opinion of Att’y Gen. Kokott, Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. 
Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 EUR-Lex CELEX 62007CC0550 (Apr. 29, 2010) 
(rejecting the argument that the legal professional privilege should extend to 
communications with attorneys not licensed to practice in an EU member 
state); see also Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd v. Comm’n, EUR-
Lex CELEX 62007J0550, ¶¶ 45, 57, 119 (E.C.J. Sept. 14, 2010) (affirming the 
opinion of AG Kokott in framing and interpreting the issues generally, though 
not on this specific point, in references throughout the opinion). 
124 Love, 275 S.C. at 59, 271 S.E.2d at 112. 
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request from a party in the E.U. But a creative and well-informed party 
seeking discovery in this state, or operating in a South Carolina court, 
could reasonably attack the privilege on the theory that the privilege 
over certain documents had been destroyed when the European 
Commission seized them;
125
 that foreign and not domestic privilege 
laws controlled any privilege determination;
126
 or that the privilege 
never attached to the documents because of the possibility of 
disclosure.
127
 Of course, the black-letter law arguments in each case 
would vary based upon the facts and circumstances of each 
determination. But in each case, it would be important to note to the 
court the strong policy in this state in favor of the privilege;
128
 
especially in those cases where the court would be called upon to elect 
between multiple frameworks for analyzing an assertion of privilege.  
In sum, the most important thing is for domestic practitioners 
with European clients to be aware of their limitations so that they can 
proceed with a heightened sense of caution and awareness in order to 
avoid disclosure of communications that were intended to be 
confidential, and to defend the privilege from attack based on policy 
grounds when faced with a potential conflict of black-letter rules.  
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Returning to the hypothetical South Carolina attorney described 
earlier, she must be aware that European supra-national law does not 
mirror South Carolina’s attorney-client privilege, and may not extend 
evidentiary privileges to communications between the attorney and the 
client in Europe. The holding, in Akzo, presents significant challenges 
for domestic in-house attorneys. Furthermore, the language of AG 
Kokott’s opinion implying that any communications from persons who 
are not members of E.U.-member state bars to a corporation would not 
be protected should concern even outside counsel advising international 
clients. These challenges have the potential to blindside attorneys who 
assume that similar evidentiary privileges will always attach to their 
communications, no matter where they go. Of course, once the 
limitations imposed by E.U. legal professional privilege law are made 
clear, the attorney may advise the client of the potential pitfalls, bring 
in outside counsel where required, and generally act with discretion to 
                                                 
125 See supra Part II.4-A. 
126 See supra Part II.4-B. 
127 See supra Part II.4-C. 
128 Love, 275 S.C. at 59, 271 S.E.2d at 112. 
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ensure that communications remain as confidential as they were 
intended to be. 
 
 
